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ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
The time a cause of action accrues has been defined as the time at
which a plaintiff is first able to maintain the action.4 The Lewis court
was quick to perceive that plaintiff could not have maintained the
action during the decedent's life, since she was entitled to receive the
proceeds from the policy only upon his death. An action sought to be
maintained upon the cancellation of the policy in 1956 would have
been premature since plaintiff had not then been injured by the breach,
and decedent could have made other arrangements before his death to
ensure that plaintiff received the amount of money that would have
been due under the policy. The plaintiff's action, although instituted
twelve years after the breach, was therefore timely. 5
CPLR 203(b)(4): Delivery of summons to foreign sheriff does not ex-
tend statute of limitations.
The statute of limitations governing any claim may be extended
sixty days if the summons is delivered to a proper sheriff pursuant to
CPLR 203(b)(4) before the expiration of the designated period.6 When
the defendant is a corporation, the "proper sheriff" is one in a county
in which the corporation may be served. It is readily apparent that
failure to comply with the statute may be a grievous error when the
limitation period has nearly expired.
In Butler v. UBS Chemical Co.,7 the plaintiff attempted to avail
himself of this sixty-day extension. However, the defendant was a
foreign corporation which, while transacting business in New York,
had its offices in Newark, New Jersey; and plaintiff had delivered the
summons to a New Jersey sheriff. The Appellate Division, First Depart-
ment, reversing the order of the trial court, declared that delivery to a
foreign sheriff does not invoke the extension; service upon the de-
fendant had therefore been effected without the three year period
governing personal injury actions,8 and the cause of action was barred.
4 Cary v. Koerner, 200 N.Y. 253, 93 N.E. 979 (1910).
5 It is clear that the court was not employing a "discovery of the breach" theory
since the statute of limitations began to run upon decedent's death. Plaintiff's knowledge
of the breach was immaterial in this regard. Cf. CPLR 206(c); CPLR 213(5) & (7);
CPLR 214(7).
6 Delivery to a "proper sheriff" beyond the expiration of the controlling statute is, of
course, ineffective. Manse Builders Inc. v. Northrup, 186 Misc. 889, 60 N.Y.S.2d 80 (Sup.
Ct. Monroe County 1946). And delivery to the wrong sheriff is also ineffective. Guilford
v. Brody, 287 App. Div. 726, 262 N.Y.S. 722 (1st Dep't 1933). However, the proper sheriff
need not serve the summons himself; any person qualified to serve the summons under
the CPLR may do so. Cohoes Bronze Co. v. Georgia Home Ins. Co., 243 App. Div. 224, 276
N.Y.S. 619 (3d Dep't 1935).
7 82 App. Div. 2d 8, 299 N.Y.S.2d 247 (lst Dep't 1969).
8 CPLR 214.
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Practitioners are well advised to examine the exact nature of the
defendant over whom jurisdiction is sought, since the result in Butler
could easily have been avoided by employing an alternative means of
service designed specifically for that type of situation.9
CPLR 217: Ambiguous "final and binding determination" resolved
against administrative body.
CPLR 217 establishes a four month period within which a pro-
ceeding against a body or officer pursuant to CPLR article 78 must be
commenced.10 The period commences when the determination of the
body or officer becomes final and binding upon a petitioner -a time
which is not always easily ascertainable. In Castaways Motel v. Schuy-
ler," the question as to when one such determination became final and
binding was presented to the New York Court of Appeals.
Petitioner therein had applied for a grant of land adjacent to its
own property but located under the Niagara River. The consent of
respondent, the Commissioner of General Services, to proceed with the
contemplated work while the application was pending was subsequently
sought, because although it was urgent that the project be completed
immediately, the time necessary for processing the application was
somewhat lengthy. Consent having been finally obtained, the petitioner
expended a considerable sum in constructing a bulkhead around the
land.
Meanwhile, the application proceeded "swiftly" through the ad-
ministrative morass. Pursuant to the Public Lands Law,' 2 the New York
State Power Authority notified respondent that the grant would be
permissible. However, he was further advised that a covenant of release
from the petitioner would be required, and that such covenant would
release the state and the authority from all past and future claims.
Petitioner was first informed of the covenant and its nature in a
letter, dated October 20, 1966, which requested him to execute the
release. Counsel was consulted, and the Chief of the Bureau of Surplus
Real Property was informed of petitioner's willingness to sign a release
for any past claims, but that it would not give a carte blanche release
for all future claims. In response to its letter petitioner was informed,
9 See N.Y. Bus. CoRe. LAw §§ 304, 307 (McKinney 1963).
10 It should be noted, however, that shorter limitation periods provided elsewhere
remain effective. CPLR 217. The court may extend the period of two years if petitioner
is under a disability specified in CPLR 208. Id. See also 1 WrmnTmN, KoRN & MILLER,
NEw YORK Civm PRAcricE 217.01 (1968).
1124 N.Y.2d 120, 247 N.E.2d 124, 299 N.Y.S.2d 148 (1969).
12 N.Y. Pu. LANDs LAW § 75(13) (McKinney 1951).
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